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**THE ROLE OF AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
IN THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT**

BY

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United States Air Force

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
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THE ROLE OF AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN THE
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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As the 1990s begin, the United States global orientation and national security interests will be continually challenged across the entire operational continuum. However, it is reasonable to expect that the majority of future conflicts will be at the low end of the continuum--low intensity conflicts. The Air Force Special Operations Forces, representing a unique component of airpower and force projection, will be trained and equipped to respond to such challenges. Properly employed, these forces along with their joint counterparts provide the deployability, versatility and lethality for force application in the future. This study provides an understanding of how the roles and missions of the Air Force Special Operations Forces are an intragral part of United States Special Operations Command five principal mission activities. It includes a review of definitions and missions. It analyzes the capabilities and limitations for deploying these forces. The study concludes that the Air Force Special Operations Forces are ready to cope with the challenges of the Twenty-first Century.

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THE ROLE OF AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

CHAPTER I


INTRODUCTION

Changes occurring throughout the world scene portend an increasingly uncertain future. The instability in the Soviet Union; the war in the deserts of Iraq and Kuwait; the continuing threat of insurgency, narcotrafficking, and terrorism present, at best, a cloudy picture. In its totality, this environment provides the backdrop for special forces and their special capabilities. James R. Locher III, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict has observed that, "The coming decade will, in particular, place a major share of the responsibility for preserving our national interests squarely on the doorsteps of those involved in special operations and low intensity conflict. It will be a time in which the specialized skills so often overlooked in the past will be needed like never before."¹

Air Force Special Operations Command, the air component command for the U.S. Special Operations Command, represents a unique component of airpower available to theater commanders, enabling them to respond to a wide variety of crises. Properly employed, the men and women of the Air Force Special Operations Command can be extremely effective

throughout the operational continuum. However, a lack of understanding of their capabilities or improper employment of them could result in mission failure, political embarrassment, and possible loss of life.

This paper will address the importance of understanding the roles and missions of the Air Force Special Operations Forces in the low intensity conflict environment. It will provide a list of definitions associated with low intensity conflict, examine the mission and the capabilities of Air Force Special Operations assets, and address certain limitations when projecting these forces into a conflict. Primarily, it can serve as a single-source document, providing an overview of and essential information about Air Force Special Operations Forces.



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CHAPTER II

DEFINITIONS

The term low intensity conflict (LIC) has been used increasingly within the American national security establishment since the late 1970's. Yet there remains a good deal of confusion over what constitutes its parameters. Also disagreement continues about the types of low intensity challenges the United States is most likely to face over the next decade.² Even so, both the academic and military communities generally agree that some form of low intensity conflict will prevail as the dominant form of violent confrontation in most parts of the world. Until recently, no universally accepted definition of low intensity conflict contributed to a strategy of containment.³ Literature on both low intensity conflict and special operations has been cluttered with misleading descriptions. In fact, different writers have used both terms to refer to very different phenomena and concepts. Defining types of conflict, combatants, and units can be a mind-numbing endeavor. But unless terminology is generally understood, communication is all but impossible.⁴

JCS Pub 3-05 defines low intensity as:

Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies.

Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed forces. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.⁵

Two key points arise from this definition. First, such conflict is "below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states." This specifies the spectrum of conflict is below conventional warfare; it implies that LIC is very limited. For those forces involved, however, the struggle is often neither low in intensity nor limited in scope; it is a war by any and all available means.⁶ Secondly, such conflicts range from subversion to the use of armed forces. Thus LIC describes an environment in which a variety of forces, both civilian and military, may be used in concert to achieve political, social, or economic objectives.⁷

AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, states that low intensity conflict presents distinct problems. It confirms that LIC can range from protracted insurgencies and subversion to terrorism and other forms of lawlessness.⁸ All of these activities could pose an apparent threat to our vital security interests. To prevail in the low intensity environment, we need a comprehensive strategy that clearly defines our roles and responsibilities. This strategy should be supported by a

well-resourced force structure capable of effectively supporting our national security objectives.

The Air Force Special Operations Forces usually play an augmenting rather than a lead role in LIC. But US Air Force commanders and planners should nonetheless become thoroughly familiar with US objectives in a particular conflict, with the context within which US forces are being applied, and with the full capabilities of the assets at their disposal.⁹ Special operations designates a capability that normally requires specially organized, trained, and equipped forces to conduct or support covert or clandestine operations. JCS Pub 3-05 provides the following definition of special forces:

Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. Politico-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques, and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.¹⁰

Thus special operations forces may be employed across the spectrum of conflict. Even so, they may have a more

critical role in LIC. But it would be erroneous to perceive special operations forces as exclusively LIC forces.

The nature of conflict, whether that conflict is of low, mid, or high intensity, shapes the character of forces that conduct military operations.¹¹ As the Iran Rescue Mission (1980) clearly exemplified, we must understand the environment in which special forces will operate. We must scrupulously acknowledge both the capabilities and limitations of whatever special forces may be employed in a given crisis. Likewise Operation Just Cause, clearly demonstrated the capabilities of the Air Force Special Operations Forces at the low end of the continuum.

CHAPTER III

MISSION

As the air component for the U.S. Special Operations Command, the primary mission of the Air Force Special Operations Command is to organize, equip, train, and educate its forces to accomplish the special operations mission activities. Special operations forces carry out five principal missions: unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, and counterterrorism.¹² Air Force Special Operations assets are ideally suited for employment in the six collateral special operations activities: humanitarian assistance, security assistance, search and rescue, counternarcotics, antiterrorism, and other security and special activities. A brief description of the five principal missions and the role the Air Force Special Operations Forces provide in these activities follow:

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Although unconventional warfare is usually associated with the Army Special Forces Rangers and the Navy SEAL teams, the Air Force Special Operations Forces can and do provide a vital augmenting force to this mission. Unconventional warfare is usually regarded as guerrilla warfare, subversion and sabotage. But, it also includes the low visibility, covert or clandestine operations of

intelligence gathering and escape and evasion. Air Force fixed and vertical-lift assets are ideally suited for these tasks. Long-range refueling capabilities and a sophisticated night low-level avionics package also facilitates insertion or extraction of special forces teams. Specially modified for high speed extraction and airdrop capability, fixed wing aircraft can provide direct support to forces behind enemy lines. In addition, the Air Force Combat Control teams are specifically trained in covert operations; they can gather and exploit human intelligence and they can carry out sabotage tactics.

DIRECT-ACTION

In the past, air power has played a vital role in direct-action operations. These operations are traditionally viewed as the classic commando raids; they are normally designed to achieve specific, well-defined, and often time-sensitive results. Conduct of such operations may call for direct-assault tactics; or for standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; or for the location, capture, or recovery of designated personnel or material. The Air Force AC-130 gunship, MH-53J Pave Low, and the MH-60G Pavehawk helicopters are ideally suited for these direct-action missions. These assets have the capability for direct attack on critical targets; they also have the capability to interdict lines of communication and defensive

target systems as necessary. The MC-130 and HC-130 aircraft provide superb fixed-wing insertion and extraction platforms. They can be used to deliver or retrieve special forces teams as well as to recover captured personnel and equipment.

Operation Just Cause proved we have the finest direct action surgical strike force in the world.¹³ The surgical precision of the active and reserve Air Force AC-130 gunship, along with the other special operation forces, completely neutralized the Panamanian Defense Forces. Armed with a side-firing 105-mm howitzer, a 40-mm gun and two 20-mm Vulcan guns, the AC-130H Spectre gunship provided devastatingly accurate fire support for troops throughout Panama.¹⁴

SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE

Special reconnaissance essentially involves putting friendly eyes on the target for acquisition of enemy targets, collection and reporting of critical information on enemy movement, and post-strike reconnaissance. It serves also for gathering meteorological, geographic, and demographic data to support specific air, land, and sea operations. The Air Force special operations weather teams are highly skilled; they specialize in gathering meteorological information. They are trained as well to gather data on enemy forces while in hostile territory. Air

Force fixed-wing assets provide ideal platforms for deep covert penetration, for target acquisition, and for post-strike reconnaissance.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

A critical instrument for assisting friendly nations responses to subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency is the program of foreign internal defense. This program fosters internal development of the economic, social, political, and military segments of the nation's structure.¹⁵ An effective foreign internal defense program can pay huge dividends when properly administered. It can stabilize the region, improve overall international cooperation, maintain US access to valuable markets, enhance US influence in the host nation and region, and, most importantly, reduce the need for increased US assistance.¹⁶

One of the objectives of the foreign internal defense program is to assist selected host nations to ensure their own security against internal disturbances. The United States thus seeks to help these nations develop their economies and to establish viable, responsive, and legitimate government institutions.¹⁷ In his 1989 annual report to Congress, US Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney provided the executive direction for such assistance: "Our role is not to shoulder the burden ourselves, but to assist others in defending themselves . . . we must train host

nation forces in the technical skills needed to accomplish their mission."18 JCS Pub 0-2 reinforces the foreign internal defense program through advocacy of specific joint activities: language training and area orientation, organizing, training and equipping for counterinsurgency, and training foreign personnel in counterinsurgency operations. JCS Pub 0-2 further specifies the Air Force role in foreign internal defense: to develop, in coordination with the other services, the doctrine, tactics, procedures, techniques, and equipment employed by Air Force forces in counterinsurgency operations.19

The former Commander-in-Chief of the United States Special Operations Command, General James J. Lindsay approved the Air Force Special Operations Command as the focal point for organization, doctrine development training, and operational proficiency for the United States Air Force foreign internal defense effort. This will not be an easy task for a fairly young command to tackle. In reality, a sound foreign internal defense program requires far greater assets than special operations forces. This mission is a joint, interagency activity within the Department of Defense. Special operations forces thus serves as one of many participants. Special operations foreign internal defense requirements may be unilateral, in the absence of any other US military effort. Or it may support other ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts, or it may

support the employment of conventional non-special operations military forces.²⁰

Since the Air Force Special Operations Command has been assigned the Air Force lead in this mission, many required capabilities inherent in this role must be considered. Manpower, equipment, support skills, employment of people and equipment may all become elements in a successful foreign internal defense program. Such areas as aircraft maintenance, communications, intelligence, air traffic control, and weather are key activities that must be considered in establishing a viable capability to assist host nations. The Air Force Special Operations Command certainly has an edge in training for the low intensity mission. The Air Force Special Operations School, located at Hurlburt Field, Florida, provides an excellent curriculum for US and allied personnel on a wide range of special operations subjects: revolutionary warfare, joint psychological operations, Latin American orientation, cross cultural communication, dynamics of international terrorism, and many more. Thus the Air Force has properly designated its Special Operations Command to assume the leading role in providing vital support to the complex mission of foreign internal defense.

COUNTERTERRORISM

Because of the sophisticated nature of terrorism, Air Force Special Operations forces have been integrated into interagency activities that employ highly specialized forces to prevent, deter, or resolve terroristic aggression. Working jointly to support the Army Rangers and the Navy SEAL teams, a joint force has been specially organized, trained, equipped, and tasked to perform the counterterrorism mission. These joint forces are trained to carry out several kinds of missions: hostage rescues, attacks on terrorist infrastructure, ship take-down operations, and numerous other counterterrorist activities. Fixed and vertical-lift aircraft provide support platforms for the infiltration or exfiltration of special teams into objective areas and standoff capability to deliver ordnance if and when a shoot-out occurs.

Additionally, as a subset of foreign internal defense, designated special operations forces units may train selected host nation forces to perform the counterterrorism mission.²¹ As mentioned earlier, the Air Force Special Operations School conducts a five-day course on the Dynamics of International Terrorism. This excellent course is designed to teach selected military and government personnel the basics of the threats posed by terrorists and certain techniques to reduce vulnerability. The course, currently

offered eight times a year, teaches the principles and psychology of terrorism and gives an indepth look at terrorism by region.²² Army Major General James Dozier and Richard Melhart, both former hostages, participate in the guest speaker program. Each brings eyewitness accounts of personal experiences with terrorism. Initiated 13 years ago in response to the growing world terrorism, the course today trains nearly 1,000 students each year.²³

In addition to the five principle missions of unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, and counterterrorism, the Air Force Special Operations forces participates in a wide range of collateral activities. Two notable examples include the search and rescue operations for Congressman Mickey Leland in Ethiopia in August 1989 and the civil affairs and psychological operations assistance in the disaster relief of St. Croix after Hurricane Hugo struck the Virgin Islands in September 1989.²⁴

Thus the Air Force Special Operations forces have assigned roles and tasks in all missions and activities assigned to the U.S. Special Operations Command. This unique component of airpower is staffed, resourced, and trained to participate in an impressive array of special operations, including those designed to increase U.S. effectiveness in LIC.

CHAPTER IV

CAPABILITIES

Air Force Special Operations forces provide unique capability and flexibility throughout the entire operational continuum. Its specially configured aircraft and highly trained personnel conduct short-notice, sensitive, and low-visibility operations. Because of the uniqueness of the mission, specially modified aircraft and helicopters are equipped with sophisticated avionics systems and defensive electronic suites. Recent upgrade programs throughout the special operations fleet have come about largely because of the failed attempt to rescue American hostages from Iran in 1980. The fiasco of this failed attempt highlighted the need for better and improved equipment.

Special operations airlift aircraft, including transport/cargo and vertical-lift resources, provide platforms to conduct low-visibility, clandestine, or covert penetration of hostile territory. They serve to infiltrate, resupply, and exfiltrate ground and maritime forces in support of unconventional warfare, direct action, surveillance, and counterterrorism operations.²⁵ The following descriptions of each major weapon system notes how the system contributes to special operations missions.

AC-130 Spectre Gunship

This gunship is equipped with 20-mm, 40-mm, and 105-mm cannons and several sensors. These capabilities make the AC-130 a very versatile weapon system. It is especially effective in providing close air support, perimeter/point defense, escort, surveillance, search and rescue, infiltration, limited exfiltration, armed reconnaissance, illumination, limited air-to-air fire control, and limited airborne command and control. Using infrared sensors, low-light-level TV, laser target designator, and a computerized fire control system, the aircraft can deliver ordnance with pinpoint accuracy, day or night, and under adverse weather conditions. Electronic countermeasure equipment gives it survivability in a low to medium threat environment. Inflight refueling provides the AC-130 with the ability for extended range and time-over-target.

In 1987 the Air Force approved purchase of 12 new AC-130U advanced gunships. This new version of the AC-130 will include some improvements: upgrades in the electronic and infrared warning and countermeasures equipment; low-light-level television system which provides a 360-degree field of view; high-resolution ground mapping system; and a battle management center to control all the sensors and weapons. Four IBM AP-102 computers will provide

fire-control system solutions, ensuring weapons will lock on and track targets within one-quarter of an orbit.²⁶

HC-130 Combat Shadow

This aircraft provides covert/ clandestine aerial refueling of vertical-lift aircraft; it can infiltrate, resupply, and exfiltrate special operations forces. It is equipped with electronic warning and limited countermeasure equipment to operate in a low-to-medium threat environment. Equipped with two 1800-gallon internal fuel tanks, the aircraft has an extended endurance and the capability to aerial refuel vertical-lift assets. Recent upgrade modifications to a limited number of HC-130s include an inflight refueling receptacle. This force multiplier capability provides the tanker fleet and the refuelable vertical-lift assets force projection considerable distances behind enemy lines. Other modifications include an improved communications and navigation system and a night-vision goggle compatible cockpit for night operations. Crews are trained for communication out/lights-out, night-vision goggle low-level contour terrain avoidance missions. They fly this profile in close formation to conduct inflight refueling or perform airdrops of special forces or resupply bundles. Crews are also trained to conduct blacked-out landings using night-vision goggles.

MC-130 Combat Talon

This aircraft is equipped with terrain-following and terrain-avoidance radar; it also has a high-precision navigation system that enables it to fly at night in adverse weather as low as 250 feet above the terrain. The aircraft is also equipped to perform low-level aerial delivery airdrops at speeds up to 300 mph. Some models are modified with a surface-to-air extraction capability for retrieving personnel or equipment. This system may also be used to recover high-value cargo and is being modified to pick up a four-to-six-man team or 1,500 pounds of cargo.²⁷ All aircraft are air inflight refuelable for increased range and endurance. Six of the MC-130s are also modified to refuel the vertical-lift assets.

Currently under test is the Combat Talon II. This updated version is equipped with state-of-the-art electronics to enable it to penetrate hostile territory. Each aircraft is being modified with night-vision goggle compatible cockpit lighting. Crews are also trained for the night blacked-out landings. With its pinpoint navigation accuracy, this aircraft can conduct airdrops on unmarked drop zones.

MH-53 Pave-Lo

This heavy-lift, twin-engined, air-refuelable helicopter is modified with terrain-following radar,

forward-looking infrared and highly sophisticated avionics packages that allow it to fly in total darkness or in adverse weather conditions as low as 100 feet. It has the airlift capability to carry up to 40 troops or three jeeps or numerous combinations thereof. These helicopters are armed with either the 7.62 minigun or .50 caliber machine gun for self-protection and limited direct-fire support. It is also equipped with a hoist, rappelling ropes, and a cargo sling.

A current major modification program will convert older HH and MH-53 to the MH-53J or Pave Low III configuration. Major enhancements include an improved navigation system using the Global Positioning System, an improved terrain-avoidance and terrain-following radar, an upgraded forward-looking infrared system, a night-vision goggle heads-up display and compatible lighting system, a new radar warning and radar threat repeater/jammer, and a new infrared countermeasures pod to confuse enemy infrared-guided weapons. The Pave Low III will also have an improved secure communications package and a data transfer system to interface with a computer-aided mission planning system.

MH-60 Pave Hawk

The newest vertical-lift asset to the Air Force Special Operations fleet is the modified MH-60G helicopter. The

Pave Hawk helicopter is equipped with weather radar, night-vision goggle compatible cockpits, .50 caliber machine guns, passive defensive countermeasures, an inertial navigation system, satellite communication capability, and an aerial refueling probe. The MH-60Gs provide a capability to conduct low-level infiltration and exfiltration as well as wartime search and rescue. With its enhanced modifications and an added internal 117-gallon fuel tank for increased endurance, the MH-60 has become an excellent platform to complement the MH-53 Pave Low mission. Because the MH-60 is equipped with a hoist and repelling ropes, crews are trained for naval ship-board operations and limited direct-fire support missions.

EC-130 Volant Solo

The EC-130 aircrafts flown by the Pennsylvania Air National Guard are the mainstay of the psychological operations of the special operations mission. Four aircraft are modified to receive, analyze and transmit various electronic signals, such as radio and TV.28 These aircraft played an important role during the Grenada operation, giving valuable information to the American students on the island.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMBAT CONTROL TEAMS

Special operations combat controllers possess specific capabilities as a fast-action deployable force in support of

unconventional warfare/special operations air assets and other related activities. They are specially trained to infiltrate by means of a variety of techniques. They can be airdropped with high-altitude-low-opening, high-altitude-high-opening parachute techniques. Or they can be inserted with a rubber raiding craft. Normally employed in two-to three-man teams to preserve a low visibility or clandestine profile, they can perform many special operations missions. They are trained to establish air assault zones in austere and non-permissive environments, set up and coordinate operations at drop zones and landing zones, and perform limited offensive strikes and demolitions in an offensive counterair environment. They can also be used to assist in extracting forces from behind enemy lines and provide human intelligence and airfield reconnaissance. They provide a unique stand-alone capability or can augment other special operations forces. In addition, combat control teams are trained to perform missions in foreign internal defense, search and rescue, air base security defense, and direct action missions.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS WEATHER TEAMS

Team members of the 6th Weather Squadron located at Hurlburt Field, Florida, are parachute qualified and capable of operating with special operations crews in remote, austere, hostile environments. These highly qualified

weather personnel provide weather information and forecasting capability through forward weather observation nets in either friendly or enemy areas.

AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS SCHOOL

The U.S. Air Force Special Operations School is located at Hurlburt Field, Florida. It educates US and allied personnel in geopolitical, psychological, sociological, and joint special operations. The purpose of these courses is to prepare selected individuals for unconventional warfare and special operations missions. The curriculum consist of thirteen different courses presented 68 times per year. The course selection ranges from regional orientation courses, cross-cultural communication, joint psychological operations, joint special operations planning workshop, revolutionary warfare, to the dynamics of international terrorism.

CHAPTER V

LIMITATIONS

Theater commanders and planners must understand that certain limitations exist when committing forces into a conflict. Planning for a contingency operation should include consideration of many factors. Accurate intelligence gathering is critical to the successful accomplishment of the overall mission. Depending on the nature of the operation, a detailed deception plan prior to and during the execution phase may spell the difference between success and failure. And certainly a well thought-out, simple, rehearsed plan, with all participants actively involved, is essential if time permits. A good example was the rehearsals prior to committing forces in Operation JUST CAUSE. On the other hand, the lack of a full dress rehearsal resulted in the unsuccessful rescue attempt of Desert One. Due to the high risk to lives involved, operational security and surprise are essential elements of a successful campaign. Secure communications interoperability with participating assets and higher command echelons must be a top priority in every planning and execution phase. In addition, executioners must actively participate in planning throughout the entire operation.

Other broad-based limitations apply generically to all Air Force Special Operations Forces:

a. These forces have limited self-deployment/sustainment capabilities and dependence on established support/logistics packages which must accompany employment aircraft. Operations may be sustained from a bare base. However, the technological sophistication of most Air Force Special Operations Forces resources limits their beddown flexibility.

b. Mission effectiveness is degraded with increasing sophistication of enemy defenses.

c. High-technology avionics equipment requires extensive maintenance support.

d. Aircrew endurance, aircraft systems limitations, and maintenance and flying regulations may restrict the duration or frequency of employment.

e. Long-range deployment and employment require aerial tanker support.

f. Forces have extremely limited defensive air-to-air capabilities.

g. Forces depend on conventional non-Special Operations air support for defensive counter air, air defense suppression, and other capabilities, as dictated by the threat.²⁹

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

Air Force Special Operations Forces capabilities offer the National Command Authority and theater commander-in-chiefs a variety of options throughout the operational continuum. Many of these capabilities were demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm. While vertical-lift assets infiltrated special teams deep behind enemy lines, the AC-130 gunship provided direct action strikes against the Iraqi forces. Although the full account of the participation of special operations forces in the Persian Gulf is classified, there is little doubt their involvement played an important part in the final outcome.

Air Force Special Operations Forces have played and will continue to play a vital role in protecting U.S. national interests that are challenged by a variety of threats.³⁰ The coming decade is likely to see a continued increased in the instabilities arising from Third World conflicts. Countries struggling to spread their religious fundamental beliefs, rises in political instability and ethnic strife, terrorism, and narcotics trafficking, will make the use of special operations forces more important than ever before. Assisting nations through foreign internal defense measures and projecting troops into troubled regions will likely be the trend rather than the

exception. Air Force Special Operations Forces stand ready to accept these challenges. Their unique capabilities will continue to make important contributions to our national security. Continued emphasis on sustaining and enhancing their capabilities will enable the United States to adapt to emerging challenges to our national security.³¹

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